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Prior research shows that after making a choice, decision makers shift their attitudes in a 
choice-congruous direction. Although this post-choice attitude change effect is robust, the 
neural mechanisms underlying it are poorly understood. Here, we tested the hypothesis 
that decision makers elaborate on their choice in reference to self-knowledge to justify 
the choice they have made. This self-referential processing of the choice is thought to 
play a pivotal role in the post-choice attitude change. 24 young American adults made a 
series of choices. They also rated their attitudes toward the choice options before and 
after the choices. In support of the current hypothesis, we found that changes in 
functional connectivity between two putative self-regions (medial prefrontal cortex 
[mPFC] and posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus [PCC/Pcu]) during the post-choice 
(versus pre-choice) rating of the chosen options predicted the post-choice shift of the 
attitudes toward the chosen options. This finding is the first to suggest that cognitive 
integration of various self-relevant cognitions is instrumental in fostering post-choice 
attitude change. 
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Connectivity between mPFC and PCC predicts post-choice attitude change: 
The self-referential processing hypothesis of choice justification  
When people make a choice, they often change their attitudes in a choice-
consistent direction (Brehm, 1956; Steele, 1988). Specifically, they will increase their 
preference for the option they chose and decrease their preference for the option that they 
rejected. Although this effect of post-choice attitude change is well established and 
thought to justify the choice, exactly how it might occur is unclear (Chen & Risen, 2010; 
Harmon-Jones, Amodio, & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Kitayama & Tompson, 2015; Steele, 
1988).  
In the current work, we addressed this gap by using functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine the possibility that the decision maker justifies her 
choice by linking the choice to various aspects of self-knowledge. Although often 
discussed in social psychological analyses of choice justification (Aronson, 1969; 
Gawronski, Bodenhausen, & Becker, 2007; Kitayama, Snibbe, Markus, & Suzuki, 2004; 
Steele & Liu, 1983), this hypothesis is difficult to test with behavioral measures alone 
since these measures can only capture down-stream, often distal outcomes of the 
psychological mechanisms under discussion. By using fMRI, it may be possible to obtain 
more direct evidence for the self-referential processing hypothesis. Motivated by a recent 
network-oriented thinking in the field (Poldrack, 2012; Rogers, Morgan, Newton, & 
Gore, 2007), we hypothesized that the post-choice attitude change should be tracked by 
the post-choice recruitment of self-relevant knowledge as indexed by the functional 
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connectivity between putative self-processing areas (i.e., medial prefrontal cortex 
[mPFC] and posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus [PCC/Pcu]; Denny, Kober, Wager, & 
Ochsner, 2012; Feyers, Collette, D’Argembeau, Majerus, & Salmon, 2010; Morel et al., 
2014; Ries et al., 2012; van der Meer, Costafreda, Aleman, & David, 2010).  
Post-Choice Attitude Change 
 In an attempt to understand the mechanisms underlying post-choice attitude 
change, it is important to consider a) what might happen during the choice and b) what 
might subsequently occur once the choice has been made. Researchers using behavioral 
measures have typically focused on the processes that occur once a choice has been made 
(post-choice processes), but recent work has begun to unpack how mechanisms during 
the choice might also contribute to post-choice attitude change (Jarcho, Berkman, & 
Lieberman, 2011; Kitayama, Chua, Tompson, & Han, 2013).  Hence, we discuss the in-
choice mechanism first although the primary focus of the current work is in the post-
choice mechanism. 
In-choice mechanism: search for positive incentives. Kitayama and Tompson 
(Kitayama et al., 2013; Kitayama & Tompson, 2015) have proposed that when making a 
choice, the decision maker will look for positive features in one of available choice 
options. These features would allow her to choose between the options. This hypothesis 
implies that before a choice is made, the decision maker may develop a new attitude 
toward one of the options and, moreover, this new attitude may enable her to choose that 
option. When the attitudes toward the relevant options are assessed at a later time, the 
chosen option will be liked more than the rejected option. Although this attitude change 
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is assessed after the choice and, thus, is seen as mediated entirely by post-choice 
mechanisms, it may well take place, at least in part, before the choice has been made. 
If the in-choice feature search is instrumental in fostering post-choice attitude 
change, one may expect that certain brain signals indicating the identification of positive 
features during the choice will predict a positive shift of the attitude toward the chosen 
option. Ventral striatum (vSTR) is a subcortical structure thought to track subjective 
value and reward (Bartra, McGuire, & Kable, 2013) and has been shown to track changes 
in subjective value as a function of situational and contextual factors (Varnum, Shi, Chen, 
Qiu, & Han, 2014) and thus vSTR should be integral in facilitating the in-choice feature 
search and updating value of the various choice options to foster post-choice attitude 
change. In support of the in-choice feature search hypothesis, research consistently finds 
a trial-by-trial change in vSTR reliably tracks post-choice attitude change (Jarcho et al., 
2011; Kitayama et al., 2013), suggesting that the decision maker chooses an option if 
during the choice he/she identifies positive features in it that activate the vSTR.1  
Post-choice mechanism: recruitment of self-knowledge. Although the in-choice 
feature search mechanism plays an important role in fostering the post-choice attitude 
change, it is unlikely that it is the only mechanism involved in this effect. In fact, even 
after having made a choice, the decision maker may continue to elaborate on information 
                                               
1 Another finding that is consistently obtained in both studies concerns PCC/Pcu. A trial-
by-trial change in the in-choice activation of this region also reliably tracked post-choice 
attitude change. As reviewed later in the paper, PCC/Pcu is often involved in self-
referential processing. Hence, the activation of PCC/Pcu could suggest some self-
processing was recruited to identify positive features in one of the options. In addition, 
Jarcho et al. identified several other regions (e.g., mPFC and IFG) as well. However, 
these regions were not replicated in the Kitayama et al. study. 
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that is relevant to the choice. According to cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) 
and subsequent elaborations of the theory (Aronson, 1969; Gawronski et al., 2007; Steele, 
1988), the decision maker may do so in order to justify the choice. Consistent with these 
theories, we propose that the justification of a choice that has been made is accomplished 
through active recruitment of an assortment of cognitions that link the chosen option to 
the self. These cognitions may include: an image of the self as smart and as a good 
decision maker, autobiographic memories involving the chosen option, and/or future 
plans with it. These diverse self-referential cognitions will be linked and integrated to 
justify the choice. For example, the image of the self as a good decision maker might be 
tied to some memory of having enjoyed using the chosen object in the past and/or certain 
plans to use it on some special occasions in the future. It is this integrated representation 
of the chosen option that reinforces the value of the choice and, thus, justifies it. 
Our self-referential processing hypothesis of choice justification implies that 
when a chosen option is presented after the choice, this option will recruit the self-
relevant cognitions that were generated during the post-choice processing of choice-
relevant information, as well as the brain regions underlying these cognitions. Previous 
studies have found that the mPFC and PCC/Pcu are linked to self-referential processing 
(Chua et al., 2011; Denny et al., 2012; Northoff et al., 2006; van der Meer et al., 2010). 
We may therefore anticipate that these putative self-regions will be activated more by the 
chosen versus the rejected options when they are presented at a later point. In contrast, 
the rejected items are unlikely linked to the self-knowledge, as they do not belong to the 
self.  
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The self-referential processing hypothesis offers another important prediction. 
The diverse self-cognitions that are recruited during the post-choice processing of the 
choice (e.g., self-images, episodes remembered, and plans made) are likely to be 
differentially represented in mPFC and PCC/Pcu. For example, numerous theorists have 
argued that abstract, trait-like representations of the self are likely to be represented 
predominantly in the mPFC region, whereas more episodic representations of the self 
might be relatively more dominant in the relative posterior regions of the brain including 
PCC/Pcu (P. Qin et al., 2012; Sajonz et al., 2010; van der Meer et al., 2010). Moreover, 
recent fMRI research has used psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analyses to 
investigate how task-dependent connectivity between brain regions is involved in 
thinking about and evaluating the self. Researchers have found that connectivity between 
mPFC and PCC/Pcu is greater when people think about and evaluate the self than when 
thinking about and evaluating others (Feyers et al., 2010; Morel et al., 2014; Ries et al., 
2012). mPFC-PCC connectivity is also greater when encoding self-referential 
information and predicts subsequent recall of self-referential information (Morel et al., 
2014). Furthermore, mPFC-PCC/Pcu connectivity is greater when evaluating whether 
trait words describe the self (self-judgments) than when evaluating whether trait words 
are positive or negative (valence judgments; Feyers et al., 2010) and the strength of this 
connectivity is positively correlated with autobiographical memory accuracy (Ries et al., 
2012). Thus, connectivity between mPFC and PCC/Pcu is thought to be involved in 
thinking about and evaluating the self as well as recalling self-relevant memories. 
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The hypothesis that these self-cognitions are integrated to justify a choice 
therefore implies that there should be increases in the functional connectivity between 
mPFC and PCC/Pcu after the choice. Importantly, the self-referential processing 
hypothesis suggests that this integration of the diverse self-cognitions is instrumental in 
justifying the choice. As a result, we may anticipate that increases in the functional 
connectivity between mPFC and PCC/Pcu should predict the post-choice (versus pre-
choice) attitude toward the chosen option. The same might not apply to the rejected 
options, insofar as the decision maker is unlikely to devote much effort in linking the 
rejected options to self-knowledge. 
 Evidence for the self-referential processing hypothesis is currently scant. In 
addition to the two fMRI studies reviewed earlier (Jarcho et al., 2011; Kitayama et al., 
2013), there are three additional fMRI studies on post-choice attitude change (Izuma et 
al., 2010; J. Qin et al., 2011; Sharot, De Martino, & Dolan, 2009). These studies focused 
on neural activations during the pre- and post-choice rating periods rather than in-choice 
activations. Given the self-referential processing hypothesis, the activation of mPFC and 
PCC/Pcu and the functional connectivity between the two regions should predict changes 
in attitudes towards the choice options. Thus far, only average activation has been tested. 
In two of the three relevant studies, hypothetical choices were used and, thus, the 
procedure was not incentive compatible with real values (Izuma et al., 2010; Sharot et al., 
2009). It is likely that when the choice is hypothetical, it does not recruit any self-
knowledge. It is therefore not surprising that these studies did not find any evidence for 
the self-referential processing hypothesis. The remaining study (J. Qin et al., 2011) used 
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an incentive compatible procedure where participants received one of the music CDs they 
chose and found that the activation of both dorsal and ventral regions of the mPFC during 
the post-choice rating of chosen options predicts the post-choice attitude change for them. 
Importantly, none of the above studies tested functional connectivity during the pre-
choice or post-choice rating tasks and it is therefore unclear whether functional 
connectivity might be involved in facilitating post-choice attitude change. 
Present Research 
Guided by the forgoing literature review, the current work tested implications of 
the self-referential processing hypothesis by using data from the Kitayama et al. (2013) 
study that had not previously been analyzed. Unlike the Kitayama et al. (2013) study, 
which focused on in-choice brain activation and tested whether this activation would 
track subsequent attitude change on a trial-by-trial basis, the current work utilized data on 
neural activation from both pre-choice and post-choice rating periods and tested between-
subjects associations between measures of the recruitment of self-knowledge and post-
choice attitude change.  
We had three primary predictions. First, for the post-choice (versus pre-choice) 
rating, the putative self-regions of the brain (mPFC and PCC/Pcu) would be activated 
relatively more by chosen options as compared to rejected options. Second, the functional 
connectivity between the two regions during the post-choice (versus pre-choice) rating 
period should be larger for the chosen options, but no corresponding increases would be 
expected for the rejected options. Third, increases in the functional connectivity between 
the two regions for the chosen options at the post-choice (versus pre-choice) rating 
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should predict post-choice (versus pre-choice) attitude toward the chosen but not rejected 
options in choice-consistent directions.  
 Our secondary goal was to explore individual differences in the degree to which 
self-processing increases from pre-choice to post-choice. Previous evidence suggests that 
individuals with independent self-construal are more likely to consider personal choices 
to be relevant to the self (Na & Kitayama, 2012; Savani, Markus, & Conner, 2008; 
Savani, Markus, Naidu, Kumar, & Berlia, 2010). Extending recent work in cultural 
neuroscience (Han et al., 2012; Hyde, Tompson, Creswell, & Falk, 2015) that has found 
that culture and self-construal influence how the brain makes social and cognitive 
judgments (Gutchess, Welsh, Boduroglu, & Park, 2006; Ma et al., 2012; Park, Tsai, 
Chim, Blevins, & Knutson, 2016; Varnum et al., 2014), we investigated whether the 
neural activation of putative self-regions (i.e., mPFC and PCC/Pcu), as well as the 
connectivity between them, during the post-choice (versus pre-choice) rating period 
might increase as a function of independent self-construal. 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-five undergraduates at the University of Michigan participated in the 
study. One participant was excluded from analysis due to excessive head movement. 
Analysis was performed on the remaining 24 participants (10 males and 14 females, 
mean age = 19.71, SD = 1.43). All participants were born and raised in the United States, 
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and had no history of head injury or psychiatric 
illness.  Participants received $50. At the end of the study, they were offered the option of 
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either keeping one of the CDs they chose or receiving eight more dollars instead of the 
CD. All participants opted for the extra cash. All participants gave written consent and 
the Institutional Review Board at the University of Michigan approved the procedure. 
Procedure and Materials 
Following the procedure from previous behavioral studies on choice (e.g., 
Kitayama et al., 2004), we used popular music CDs as stimuli. We sampled 160 CDs 
from the Billboard Top 100 music CDs and the Apple iTunes Top 100 music CDs from 
September 2009 to November 2009 and conducted the study during the first half of 2010. 
Approximately 1.5 weeks prior to the experiment, participants filled out a survey 
packet that included the Singelis self-construal scale (Singelis, 1994). Upon arrival at the 
fMRI center, participants performed three tasks inside the scanner. First, they completed 
two runs of a pre-choice rating task. They were shown the covers for 120 popular music 
CDs one at a time in randomized order (60 CDs in each run), and asked to rate how much 
they liked each CD on a 5-point scale (1=least likeable, 5=most likeable). The cover of 
each CD was displayed for 3 seconds along with the artist and album title, with an 
average inter-stimulus interval of 4 seconds (2, 4 or 6s, jittered). The second fMRI task 
involved a single run of the choice task.  Participants were presented with 60 pairs of CD 
covers (30 easy pairs and 30 difficult pairs as determined by how similar or different they 
rated the items during the pre-choice rating task). Participants selected the CD they 
wanted in each pair.  It was explained that one of the 60 CDs chosen by the participant 
would be randomly selected and given to the participant at the end of the session; so the 
choices were incentive compatible with real values. Third, participants repeated two runs 
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of the rating task described above. This study focuses on brain activation patterns during 
the pre-choice and post-choice rating tasks.  
Singelis Scale 
We used an abbreviated 20-item version of the Singelis self-construal scale 
(Singelis, 1994) to assess independent and interdependent self-construal (See Appendix 
for specific items used). This version of the scale consists of two subscales (10 items 
each). Independent self-construal was assessed by averaging each participant’s responses 
to 10 items pertaining to one’s uniqueness and autonomy (e.g., “I enjoy being unique and 
different from others in many respects”), whereas interdependent self-construal was 
assessed by averaging each participant’s response to 10 items concerning one’s 
interpersonal relatedness and values placed on social harmony (e.g., “I will sacrifice my 
self-interest for the benefit of the group I am in”). Participants rated how much each item 
described the self on a 5-point scale (1=doesn’t describe me at all, 5=describes me very 
much). The reliabilities were comparable to those obtained in previous work (Cronbach’s 
αs =.76 and .59, for independence and interdependence, respectively). 
Participants reported slightly higher independent self-construal (M=3.74, 
SD=0.55) than interdependent self-construal (M=3.56, SD=0.47), although this difference 
was not statistically significant (t(23)=1.01, p=.323). There was a significant negative 
correlation between independent and interdependent self-construal (r=-.46, p=.025), such 
that individuals who reported higher independent self-construal were also more likely to 
report lower interdependent self-construal. 
fMRI Data Acquisition 
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Participants were tested in a GE 3T Signa Excite 2 scanner (Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin). We first acquired a standard T1 structural image for alignment (TR = 250, 
TE = 3.7, FA = 75, FOV = 220, 43 oblique axial slices, matrix 256 x 256, slice thickness 
= 3.5, 0 skip).  During the experimental task, T2*-weighted, spiral-in acquisition 
sequence were acquired (gradient echo, TR = 2000, TE = 30, FA = 90, FOV = 220, 43 
oblique axial slices, matrix 64 x 64, slice thickness 3.0 mm, 0 skip).  Four initial volumes 
were discarded at the beginning of each run to allow for stabilization of the MRI signal. 
Finally, a high-resolution T1 anatomical scan was obtained (three-dimensional spoiled-
gradient echo [SPGR] with inversion recovery prep, time of inversion = 400 ms, TR = 
9.0, TE = 1.8, FA = 15, FOV = 260, 128 slices, matrix 256 x 256, 1.2 mm slice, 0 skip). 
fMRI Data Analysis 
Data were analyzed using the statistical parametric mapping software package, 
SPM8 (Welcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK). Functional volumes 
were slice time corrected using MCFLIRT (Jenkinson, Bannister, Brady, & Smith, 2002) 
to account for temporal differences in slice acquisition time, realigned to correct for head 
motion, and spatially normalized to a standard template based upon the Montreal 
Neurological Institute (MNI) reference brain using VBM8 toolbox and DARTEL high 
dimensional warping, and spatially smoothed using a 5-mm Gaussian kernel. 
Data for the pre-choice and post-choice rating tasks were modeled using an event-
related design and a modified general linear model (Worsley, Evans, Marrett, & Neelin, 
1992; Worsley, Poline, Friston, & Evans, 1997). First-level models included a boxcar 
function for each 3-second trial, with separate regressors for time (pre-choice vs. post-
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choice), choice (chosen vs. rejected), and difficulty (difficulty vs. easy, defined by the 
pre-choice difference in preference ratings for the CDs in each pair).2 Movement 
parameters were included as covariates for all models. 
We used a large-scale study on self-referential processing (Chua et al., 2011) to 
define a set of a priori functional ROIs in mPFC and PCC/Pcu. Using SPM8 and 
MarsBaR, we created 10mm sphere ROIs around the peak voxels in the mPFC (3,60,12) 
and PCC/Pcu (-3,-51,33) regions that have been linked to thinking about and evaluating 
the self (relative to a valence judgment; FWE-corrected, p<.05, cluster threshold of k>50; 
see Figure 1). All coordinates are reported in MNI space. We ran two sets of analyses 
using our a priori mPFC and PCC/Pcu ROIs focusing on (i) the activations of the mPFC 
and PCC/Pcu ROIs and (ii) the functional connectivity between the two ROIs.  
Activation of the mPFC and PCC/Pcu ROIs. A series of three analyses were 
performed. (i) The average activation of each ROI was analyzed in a 2 (Choice) x 2 
(Time) repeated-measures ANOVA. Follow-up simple effects analyses were performed 
with two-tailed t-tests, with significance threshold set to 0.05. (ii) We used multiple linear 
regression analyses to test whether the mPFC and PCC/Pcu activations during the post-
choice (versus in-choice) rating period of chosen options would predict the post-choice 
attitude change for these options. This same analysis was repeated for rejected options. 
(iii) Further, we used linear regression analysis to explore whether independent or 
interdependent self-construals would predict the mPFC and PCC/Pcu activations during 
                                               
2 No main effects or interactions were observed for Difficulty and so subsequent 
analyses focused on the effects of Choice and Time.  
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the post-choice (versus pre-choice) rating of chosen options. We repeated the same 
analysis for the rejected options.   
 Functional connectivity between mPFC and PCC/Pcu. In order to examine the 
functional connectivity between mPFC and PCC/Pcu, we used a generalized psycho-
physiological interaction (gPPI) analysis with the mPFC ROI as the seed (McLaren, Ries, 
Xu, & Johnson, 2012). Similar to standard PPI (sPPI), gPPI identifies an association 
between the time courses of activation for two regions first and then tests whether the 
magnitude of this association will vary as a function of a psychological variable(s). If the 
association between the two regions should vary as a function of this psychological 
variable(s), this psycho-physiological interaction (PPI) would constitute evidence for the 
functional connectivity between the two regions. Unlike sPPI, gPPI identifies the strength 
of this association in each condition separately (i.e., identifies a separate regressor for 
each condition and the interaction between the time course for each condition and the 
time course of the neural activation). This allows researchers more flexibility to run 
multiple contrasts to test whether this relationship differs for one condition versus another 
(or versus multiple other conditions), especially when there are more than two conditions 
(McLaren et al., 2012).  
We used the same set of analyses that were used to examine average activation 
within mPFC and PCC/Pcu to examine the functional connectivity between mPFC and 
PCC/Pcu. For every voxel outside of the mPFC ROI, we first computed the task-related 
association between each voxel and the mPFC ROI (i.e., computed the PPI regressor). 
This was done separately for each of the four conditions defined by Time (pre- versus 
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post-choice) and Choice (chosen versus rejected). We then extracted the average beta 
value in the PCC/Pcu ROI in each of the four conditions to get a measure of the task-
related association between mPFC and PCC/Pcu in each condition.  
(i) The average beta values for mPFC-PCC/Pcu functional connectivity were 
submitted to a 2 (Choice) x 2 (Time) repeated-measures ANOVA. Follow-up simple 
effects analyses were performed with two-tailed t-tests, with significance threshold set to 
0.05. (ii) For the chosen options, we tested whether increases in the functional 
connectivity between mPFC and PCC/Pcu during the post-choice (versus pre-choice) 
rating period would predict post-choice attitude change in a regression analysis. We ran 
the same set of analyses for rejected options. (iii) Further, we explored whether 
independent or interdependent self-construals would predict the changes in the functional 
connectivity between mPFC and PCC/Pcu during the post-choice (versus pre-choice) 
rating of the chosen options. We repeated the same analysis for the rejected options. 
Results 
Behavioral Results 
We first analyzed preference ratings of the options. We found a significant 2-way 
interaction between choice (chosen vs. rejected) and time (pre-choice vs. post-choice; 
F(1,23) =8.26, p =.009). Preference for chosen options increased from pre-choice 
(M=3.16, SD=0.37) to post-choice (M=3.25, SD=0.41; t(23)=7.01, p<.001), whereas 
preference for rejected options decreased from pre-choice (M=2.13, SD=0.38) to post-
choice (M=2.03, SD=0.34; t(23)=-4.15, p<.001). There was no correlation between the 
behavioral ratings and either independent self-construal or interdependent self-construal. 
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mPFC and PCC/Pcu activations. The mPFC activations in the relevant 
conditions are shown in Figure 1-A. The Choice x Time interaction was significant 
(F(1,23)=5.32, p=.030). Subsequent simple effect tests showed that the activation was no 
different between the chosen and the rejected options at the pre-choice rating period (t 
(23)=-0.45, p=.657), but it was significantly greater for the chosen options than for the 
rejected options during the post-choice rating (t(23)=3.07, p=.005). The pattern for the 
PCC/Pcu activation, shown in Figure 1-B, also showed a significant interaction between 
Choice and Time (F(1,23)=6.74, p=.016). The PCC/Pcu activation was no different 
between the chosen and the rejected options at the pre-choice rating (t (23)=0.96, 
p=.349), but it was significantly greater for the chosen options than for the rejected 
options during the post-choice rating period (t(23)=4.21, p<.001).  
Subsequent regression analyses showed that the changes in the activation of 
mPFC and PCC/Pcu did not predict post-choice attitude change. The mPFC activation 
during the post-choice (versus pre-choice) rating of the chosen options had no effect on 
the post-choice (versus pre-choice) attitude for the chosen options (β=-.33, p=.13). It also 
had no effect on the post-choice (versus pre-choice) attitude for the rejected options (β=-
.10, p=.654). The PCC/Pcu activation during the post-choice (versus pre-choice) rating of 
the chosen options had no effect on the post-choice (versus pre-choice) attitude of these 
options (β=-.01, p=.987). It also had no effect on the post-choice (versus pre-choice) 
attitude for the rejected options (β= -.08, p=.701, respectively).   
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Further regression analyses tested the effects of independent and interdependent 
self-construals. We found that increases in independent self-construal predicted increased 
activations in mPFC  (β=.50, p=.012) and PCC/Pcu (β=.47, p=.020) from pre-choice to 
post-choice for chosen options. There was no effect of independent self-construal on 
neural activation for rejected options, nor was there a relationship between 
interdependent self-construal and neural activation for chosen or rejected options3.  
Functional connectivity between mPFC and PCC/Pcu. When the task-related 
association between the two putative self-regions (mPFC and PCC/Pcu) was analyzed as 
a function of Choice and Time, the interaction between these two factors did not achieve 
statistical significance (F(23)=1.88, p=.184). Nevertheless, this association did increase, 
albeit marginally, during the post-choice (versus pre-choice) rating of the chosen options 
(t(23)=1.77, p=.091). In contrast, there was no change from pre-choice to post-choice in 
the functional connectivity between the two regions during the rating of the rejected 
options (t(23)=0.55, p=.587; see Figure 2-A). This pattern suggests a slight increase of 
the functional connectivity between the two regions during the rating of the chosen 
options. 
Subsequent regression analyses tested whether increases in the functional 
connectivity between the two regions during the post-choice (versus pre-choice) rating of 
the chosen options would predict the post-choice (versus pre-choice) attitudes toward 
                                               
3
 In addition, we tested whether brain activation for any of the analyses above 
would be moderated by choice difficulty. There were no significant differences between 
difficult and easy choices for any of the analyses noted above. 
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these options. As shown in Figure 2-B, we found that the increases in this association 
significantly predicted the attitude change for the chosen options (β=.43, p=.035). This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that increased functional connectivity between the two 
putative self-regions in the processing of the chosen options reinforces the positive 
attitude toward them. There was no comparable effect for the rejected options (β=.01, 
p=.956). 
Further regression analyses tested the effects of independent and interdependent 
self-construals on the functional connectivity between the two putative self-regions 
(mPFC and PCC/Pcu). There was no effect of either independent self-construal or 
interdependent self-construal on this association at the post-choice (versus pre-choice) 
rating for the chosen options (β=.02, p=.934; β=-.20, p=.344; respectively). Nor did we 
find any effect of either independent self-construal or interdependent self-construal on 
this association at the post-choice (versus pre-choice) rating of the rejected options 
(β=.07, p=.735; β=.-.03, p=.904; respectively).  
Discussion 
The Self-Referential Processing Hypothesis of Post-Choice Attitude Change 
The self-referential processing hypothesis of post-choice attitude change holds 
that after making a choice, individuals link the choice to their self-knowledge so as to 
justify it. The hypothesis is consistent with the existing social psychological theories of 
post-choice attitude change (Aronson, 1969; Kitayama & Tompson, 2015; Steele, 1988; 
Stone & Cooper, 2001). Moreover, it offers clear predictions about the brain mechanisms 
that are likely to be recruited to produce choice justification. The current work provided 
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the first neural evidence that lends support to some critical implications of this 
hypothesis.  
First, we observed that during the post-choice (versus pre-choice) rating of the 
chosen (versus rejected) options there was an increased activation in both mPFC and 
PCC/Pcu (the two primary regions putatively linked to self-referential processing). 
Second, there was a marginal increase in the connectivity between the two regions during 
the post-choice (versus pre-choice) rating of the chosen options. No comparable effect 
was evident for the rejected options. Third and most importantly, the increased functional 
connectivity between the two putative self-regions during the post-choice (versus pre-
choice) rating of the chosen options reliably predicted the post-choice attitude change of 
the chosen options. There was no effect of the functional connectivity for the rejected 
options. Nor was there any effect of the activation of either mPFC or PCC/Pcu assessed 
separately on post-choice attitude change. Taken together, the evidence is consistent with 
the hypothesis that the cognitive integration of diverse self-referential cognitions (e.g., 
self-images, episodes, and plans) and the functional connectivity of the separate regions 
that are involved, rather than separate activations of these cognitions and the 
corresponding regions, are instrumental in forging choice justification.  
One additional finding is potentially important. We assessed independent and 
interdependent self-construal and found that independent self-construal reliably predicted 
changes in neural activation within mPFC and PCC/Pcu for chosen options. This finding 
lends some tentative support to the prediction that individuals who view the self as 
independent from others take their choices more seriously and thus expend more effort to 
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justify them. In the current study, however, the increased activation of mPFC and 
PCC/Pcu was not related either to greater connectivity between mPFC and PCC/Pcu or to 
post-choice attitude change. Thus, we found no evidence that independent self-construal 
is linked to a greater likelihood of choice justification.  
Altogether, our work goes beyond previous work that has examined post-choice 
mechanisms of choice justification (Izuma et al., 2010; J. Qin et al., 2011; Sharot et al., 
2009). Unlike Izuma et al. (2010) and Sharot et al. (2009), we used an incentive 
compatible procedure where participants received one of the options they chose. This 
could explain why neither Izuma et al. nor Sharot et al. found any evidence for the self-
referential processing hypothesis, but we did. Unlike Qin et al. (2011), we used a region 
of interest analysis, which enabled us to disambiguate the functional significance of our 
brain activation data. Most importantly, none of the previous studies examined post-
choice functional connectivity, and our study was the first to test whether functional 
connectivity predicts post-choice attitude change. This work therefore expands upon 
previous work by showing that networks of brain regions are important in promoting and 
facilitating post-choice attitude change.  
Interestingly, our data suggest that the functional connectivity between brain 
regions that are putatively involved in self-processing is empirically distinct from the 
activation of each of the two regions assessed separately. Moreover, it is the functional 
connectivity rather than the separate activation of each region that may be more directly 
linked to integrative or schematic cognitions that are thought to underlie choice 
justification. This more dynamic facet of brain network must be further capitalized on in 
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future work to advance our understanding of the neural mechanisms underlying how 
people think about the self. 
Integrating the In-choice and Post-choice Mechanisms 
 Post-choice attitude change is likely to be mediated by both in-choice 
mechanisms and post-choice mechanisms. Our earlier work tested in-choice mechanisms 
including a search of positive features in one choice option (Kitayama et al., 2013), 
whereas the current work tested post-choice mechanisms including self-referential 
processing. Although the two mechanisms are conceptually distinct, they might in fact be 
interconnected and the entire process might be far more recursive than our discussion so 
far might imply (Kitayama & Tompson, 2015). 
 For example, when two equally attractive options are presented for a choice, the 
decision maker is likely to seek positive features that are uniquely linked to one of the 
options. These features are unlikely to be purely perceptual. To the contrary, more often 
than not, substantial cognitive processing including retrieval of prior episodes and future 
plans may be required to recognize certain features as positive. Hence, it is likely that 
certain degrees of self-referential processing are involved during the in-choice 
processing. Consistent with this line of analysis, prior evidence suggests that in-choice 
activation of PCC/Pcu (a region closely linked to self-referential processing) tracks post-
choice attitude change (Jarcho et al., 2011; Kitayama et al., 2013; see Footnote 1). Hence, 
higher-order self-referential cognitions may be already implicated very early on during 
the choice processes.  
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Moreover, once one of the options has been chosen, individuals may be expected 
to expend further self-referential processing to justify the choice. Yet, it is conceivable 
that this self-referential processing reinforces the affective value of the chosen option as 
represented in the subcortical reward processing regions of the brain including vSTR 
(Kitayama & Tompson, 2015). Hence, it is plausible that at least under certain conditions, 
post-choice activation of vSTR tracks post-choice attitude change. Evidence for this 
prediction exists in the literature (Izuma et al., 2010; Sharot et al., 2009) although we did 
not find any evidence for it in an additional exploratory whole-brain analysis.  
At present, we have no analytic tools at hand to analyze the feedback / feed-
forward links between the in-choice and the post-choice mechanisms discussed above. 
Future work would nonetheless benefit from a more concerted analysis of this issue. 
Is Post-Choice Attitude Change No More Than A Statistical Artifact? 
By using neuroimaging to examine underlying mechanisms, our work addressed a 
recent criticism that post-choice attitude change is no more than a statistical artifact. Chen 
& Risen (2010) have argued that measurement error obscures differences in true 
preferences for the two choice options. They argue that even when two choice options are 
initially rated as equally preferred, it is likely that the individual’s true preference for one 
option is actually greater than the other. This has two consequences. First, the individual 
will choose the option that is actually more preferred (according to the individual’s true 
preferences) even though the initial ratings suggested that they were equally preferred. 
Second, because the true preference for the chosen option was actually greater than the 
true preference for the rejected option, the second, post-choice rating of the chosen option 
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is likely to increase, whereas the second post-choice rating of the rejected option is likely 
to decrease. Following this line of reasoning, Chen and Risen have argued that the 
measurement errors associated with the initial preference rating might be solely 
responsible for the post-choice attitude change and thus psychological processes (e.g., 
cognitive dissonance, self-referential processing, etc.) are not required for this attitude 
change to occur.  
Although certain mathematical details involved in the original analysis have since 
been called into question (Alós-Ferrer & Shi, 2015), the statistical artifact implied by the 
Chen & Risen (2010) argument stands as a logical possibility that could increase post-
choice attitude change. However, because measurement of attitude change and 
measurement of neural activation are independent, the artifact described by Chen and 
Risen is unlikely to lead to any systematic changes in the activation in any brain regions, 
connectivity among them, or the association between these brain signals and attitude 
change (Kitayama, Tompson, & Chua, 2014). If post-choice attitude change is predicted 
by neural activation, then we can conclude that some meaningful percentage of this 
attitude change is independent of the statistical artifact described by Chen and Risen. 
Hence, our findings underscore the veracity of post-choice attitude change as a 
psychological phenomenon.  
Concluding Remarks 
The most important contribution of the current work is to show that connectivity 
between brain regions during post-choice evaluation of the choice options contributes to 
attitude change. These findings extend previous research that hypothesized self-
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referential processing to account for post-choice attitude change without directly 
assessing this processing (Aronson, 1969; Gawronski et al., 2007; Steele, 1988; Stone & 
Cooper, 2001). In addition to contributing to the current understanding of brain 
mechanisms underlying choice justification, our findings also underscore the potential of 
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Abbreviated 20-Item Version of Singelis (1994) Self-Construal Scale 
 
Item Subscale 
1. I always try to have my own opinions. Independence 
2. I am comfortable with being singled out for praise or rewards. Independence 
3. The best decisions for me are the ones I made by myself. Independence 
4. In general I make my own decisions. Independence 
5. I act the same way no matter who I am with. Independence 
6. I am not concerned if my ideas or behavior are different from 
those of other people. 
Independence 
7. I always express my opinions clearly. Independence 
8. Being able to take care of myself is a primary concern for me. Independence 
9. I enjoy being unique and different from others in many respects. Independence 
10. I do my own thing, regardless of what others think. Independence 
11. I am concerned about what people think of me. Interdependence 
12. In my own personal relationships I am concerned about the other 
person's status compared to me and the nature of our relationship. 
Interdependence 
13. I think it is important to keep good relations among one's 
acquaintances. 
Interdependence 
14. I avoid having conflicts with members of my group. Interdependence 
15. When my opinion is in conflict with that of another person's, I 
often accept the other opinion. 
Interdependence 
16. I respect people who are modest about themselves. Interdependence 
17. I will sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of the group I am 
in. 
Interdependence 
18. I often have the feeling that my relationships with others are 
more important than my own accomplishment. 
Interdependence 
19. I feel my fate is intertwined with the fate of those around me. Interdependence 
20. Depending on the situation and the people that are present, I will 
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Figure 1. Two regions of interest (ROIs) and the activity in the ROIs as a function of choice: Specific regions 
of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and the posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus (PCC/Pcu) were 
identified on the basis of Chua et al. (2011; top images). Each ROI showed a systematic change in activity 
as a function of choice (A and B, respectively). All activation is relative to an implicit fixation baseline. Error 
bars are standard error.  
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Figure 2. Functional connectivity between mPFC and PCC/Pcu ROIs: Connectivity increased for chosen 
options and predicted changes in attitudes towards the chosen options after the choice. Figure 2-A 
represents activation relative to implicit fixation baseline, with error bars representing standard error for 
each condition. Figure 2-B shows change in appraisals of the chosen options as a function of the change in 
connectivity between mPFC and PCC/Pcu.  
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